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Inhabiting	the	good	city:	the	politics	of	hate	and	the	urbanisms	
of	hope	
Andrew	Davey	and	Elaine	Graham		
	
The	 voice	 of	 the	 Church	 and	 other	 faith	 groups	 has	 become	 a	 significant	
contribution	in	the	civic	lives	of	our	cities	and	the	development	of	urban	policy	
over	 the	 past	 25	 years.	 National	 government,	 regional	 development	 agencies,	
local	 authorities	 and	neighbourhood	 renewal	 programmes	 all	 regularly	 engage	
with	 religious	 bodies	 as	 part	 of	 the	 planning	 and	 delivery	 of	 regeneration	 and	
services	in	urban	communities.	Of	all	the	faith	groups,	it	is	the	Church	of	England,	
through	 the	 ubiquity	 of	 its	 presence	 and	 experience,	 that	 has	 accompanied	
communities,	 previously	 designated	 as	 Urban	 Priority	 Areas,	 experiencing	
economic	 and	 physical	 regeneration,	 often	 from	 within	 broad‐based	
partnerships	which	 have	 brought	 about	 significant	 change	 (Graham	 and	 Lowe,	
2009;	Davey,	2000).		
	
Beyond	 the	 revitalised	 city	 centres	and	metropolitan	hum,	 the	Church	has	also	
been	present	within	those	communities	which	even	government	ministers	have	
been	willing	to	describe	as	‘disconnected’,	where	
	
	Traditional,	often	semi‐skilled,	industrial	jobs	have	continued	to	decline,	
with	newly	 created	higher	paid	 jobs	 are	open	only	 to	 those	with	higher	
skill	 levels.	In	predominantly	white	areas,	recent	migration	is	sometimes	
perceived	as	changing	communities	in	unpredictable	ways….	creating	new	
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competition	 for	 jobs	 and	 social	 housing.	 	 […]	 They	 think	 their	 area	 is	
changing	‐	they	say	'it's	not	my	community	anymore'.	And	feel	helpless	to	
do	anything	about	it.	'No	one	speaks	up	for	us.’	(Denham,	2009)		
	
Since	 the	 mid‐eighties	 the	 Church	 of	 England	 has	 produced	 significant	
documentation	 of	 urban	 conditions	 and	 spoken	 of	 the	 Church’s	 dilemma	 as	 it	
attempts	 to	 remain	 faithful	 within	 an	 urban	 parish	 structure	 which	 is	
increasingly	overshadowed	by	suburban	congregational	agendas	(ACUPA,	1985;	
CULF,	2006).	While	there	have	been	calls	 for	a	greater	awareness	of	contextual	
approaches	 where	 theological	 method	 might	 provide	 a	 common	 ground	 for	
different	communities,	predominant	training	and	mission	agendas	have	inclined	
towards	suburban	models	and	practice.	 	 It	 is	apparent,	however,	 that	a	distinct	
dimension	 within	 British	 urban	 theological	 practice	 has	 been	 its	 tenacious	
interaction	with	liberation	theology,	a	commitment	to	social	justice	and	to	‘keep	
faith’	 by	 maintaining	 a	 presence	 alongside	 marginalised	 communities	 in	 such	
places	(CULF,	2006;	Davey,	2008;	Graham	and	Lowe,	2009).	
	
Regenerated	communities?	
	
Urban	regeneration	has	proved	exacting	and	divisive	for	some	communities.		The	
experience	of	working	in	partnership	has	been	mixed:	some	have	found	a	vitality	
with	 many	 stake‐holders	 around	 the	 table	 seeking	 to	 invigorate	 and	 rebuild	
neighbourhood;	 others	 have	 found	 partnerships	 to	 be	 uneven,	 and	 at	 times	
token,	 as	 concessions	 are	made	 to	 a	 profit‐led	 regeneration	 industry	 (Harvey,	
2008;	 Steele,	 2009).	 Despite	 their	 own	 transnationalism,	 however,	 faith	
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communities	 have	 often	 seemed	 ill‐equipped	 to	 tackle	 the	 global	 nature	 of	 the	
regeneration	industry.	 	Major	inward	investment	has	often	come	from	interests	
with	little	regard	for	local	impact,	remodelling	space	and	markets	on	a	globalised	
template.	
	
The	fault	is	not	entirely	with	the	private	sector.	Often	for	the	voluntary	and	faith	
sectors,	regeneration	activity	has	become	a	scramble	for	influence	and	status,	or	
contracts	 and	 grants,	 with	 attendant	 risks	 of	 collusion	 in	 the	 name	 of	
partnership.	At	times	this	has	meant	that	the	Church	and	other	faith	groups	have	
missed	or	not	understood	significant	shifts	in	policy,	such	as	the	marginalisation	
of	 community‐led	neighbourhood	 renewal	within	what	 is	 now	 the	Department	
for	 Communities	 and	 Local	 Government,	 and	 what	 Allan	 Cochrane	 (2007)	
identifies	as	the	disappearance	of	a	distinct	urban	policy	focus	from	the	political	
agenda.	 Justin	 Beaumont’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 re‐emergence	 of	 faith‐based	
organisations	 in	 the	wake	of	neo‐liberal	 retrenchment	of	 the	 social	democratic	
welfare	state	just	as	government	is	looking	for	partners	from	the	community	and	
voluntary	sector	to	step	into	the	breach,	neatly	captures	a	further	dimension	of	
this	greater	prominence	of	faith‐communities	as	political	actors,	not	 least	some	
of	the	more	contradictory	and	frustrating	aspects.	Certainly,	as	Beaumont	argues,	
‘we	need	to	conceptualise	changing	dynamics	between	religion,	politics	and	post‐
secular	 society’	 (2008:	 2019),	 but	 the	 realignments	 of	 capital,	 civil	 society	 and	
the	 nation‐state	 as	 players	 in	 the	 regeneration	 game	 represent	 ambivalent	
opportunities	 for	 grass‐roots	 activism.	On	 the	one	hand,	 they	offer	new	spaces	
for	innovative	forms	of	engagement,	as	with	the	enhanced	public	profile	of	faith‐
based	 organisations	 in	 policy	 matters.	 On	 the	 other,	 however,	 they	 engender	
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alienation	amongst	those	who	find	themselves	receiving	little	benefit	from	urban	
regeneration	 strategies	 that	 regard	 cultural	 industries	 or	 prestigious	 property	
development	as	prime	drivers	of	economic	revival	(see	Graham	and	Lowe,	2009:	
99‐114,	Harvey,	2008).		
	
Theologians	 and	 faith‐practitioners	 are	 only	 beginning	 to	 understand	 the	
consequences	of	asking	‘Who	is	the	city	for?’	as	part	of	the	‘What	makes	a	good	
city?’	debate.		Yet	questions	of	power,	participation	and	the	nature	of	citizenship	
are	 still	 crucial	 to	 any	 future	 patterns	 of	 regeneration,	 and	 the	 current	
disenchantment	with	 local	and	national	politics	has	a	detrimental	effect	on	 the	
lives	of	our	towns	and	cities.	People	are	turning	their	backs	on	community	and	
civic	engagement	as	they	see	few	prospects	with	the	progress	of	the	recession	for	
the	 renewal	 of	 resources	 and	 infrastructure	 that	 might	 make	 a	 difference;	 or	
worse	 they	 are	 turning	 to	 those	who	 offer	 the	 alternative	 scenario	 of	 a	 nation	
that	resists	the	changes	brought	on	by	globalisation	and	immigration.	This	finds	
an	 outlet	 in	 the	 increasing	 hostility	 towards	 cosmopolitanism	 and	
multiculturalism	perceived	 as	 a	 conspiracy	 against	 the	white	working	 class	 by	
the	metropolitan	(regenerated)	elite.	
		
Disorder,	diversity	and		division	
	
There	has	always	been	a	strong	theme	within	urban	policy	that	urban	places	are	
disorderly,	 evidenced	 by	 riots	 and	 uprisings,	 as	 well	 as	 street‐level	 crime	
attributable	 to	 the	 presence	 of	minority	 ethnic	 communities	 (Cochrane	 	 2007:	
71).	While	much	early	urban	policy	under	New	Labour	shifted	 the	emphasis	of	
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urban	renewal	to	economic	regeneration	and	the	built	environment	 	within	the	
rhetoric	of	social	exclusion,	there	was	a	persistent	fear	of,	 in	the	words	of	Tony	
Blair,	 	 an	 ‘underclass	of	people	 	 cut	off	 from	society’s	mainstream	without	any	
sense	of	shared	purpose’	(Blair,	quoted	in	Lister,	2004:	108).	The	central	efforts	
of	the	New	Labour’s	Social	Exclusion	Unit	seemed	aimed	at	the	usual	focuses	of	
urban	 intervention	 and	 the	 Unit	was	 launched	 in	 1997	 by	 a	 prime	ministerial	
visits	to	the	multi‐ethnic	Aylesbury	Estate	in	South	London.		
	
In	 parallel	 with	 this,	 much	 of	 the	 regeneration	 activity	 focused	 on	 the	 built	
environment	 has	 concentrated	 on	 a	 new	 metropolitan	 elite	 who	 demand	
‘defended	 spaces’	within	 the	 urban	 core,	 gated	 and	monitored	 by	 CCTV.	While	
urban	writers	since	Engels	have	celebrated	the	city	as	an	encounter	of	strangers,	
urban	 restructuring	 has	 meant	 that	 those	 encounters	 with	 difference	 have	
become	 increasingly	 limited	 for	 those	who	 can	 afford	 to	 ‘opt	 out’	 from	mixed	
neighbourhoods,	community	schools	and	other	local	interactions	(Minton,	2009).		
An	increasingly	negative	perception	of	ethnically	diverse	localities	is	part	of	this	
trend,	along	with	the	perceived	threats	to	culture,	faith	and	employment	by	mass	
immigration	and	the	association	of	migrants	with	crime,	disease	and	disorder.			
	
After	Multiculturalism			
	
Tariq	 Modood	 has	 defined	 multiculturalism	 as	 ‘the	 recognition	 of	 group	
difference	within	the	public	sphere	of	 laws,	policies,	democratic	discourses	and	
the	 terms	 of	 citizenship	 and	 national	 identity’	 (Modood,	 2007:	 2).	 Britain	 is	 a	
multicultural	society,	 therefore,	but	 the	adoption	of	policies	of	multiculturalism	
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implies	 a	 ‘normative	 response’	 (Parekh,	 2006:	 6)	 to	 the	 facts	 of	 ethnic	 and	
cultural	 difference.	 	 Diversity	 is	 upheld	 and	 celebrated,	 but	 in	 a	 way	 which	
adopts	 a	 highly	 pragmatic	 and	 non‐prescriptive	 approach	 towards	 the	
implications	of	difference	(Dinham,	Furbey	and	Lowndes,	2009:	84‐86).		
	
Over	the	past	 twenty	years,	however,	significant	change	has	taken	place	within	
the	 interaction	 of	 immigrant	 communities	 in	 Britain	 as	 the	 post‐immigration	
discourse	of	multiculturalism	and	‘political	blackness’	began	to	crack	when	faith	
entered	the	arena.		For	Tariq	Modood,	this	was	no	better	symbolised	than	in	the	
battle	 over	 The	 Satanic	 Verses	 in	 the	 mid‐1980s,	 when	 many	 Muslims	 were	
radicalised	 and	 organised	 discovering	 a	 new	 community	 identity	 based	 on	
religion	 rather	 than	 colour.	 This	 shift	 had	 significant	 impact	 on	 multicultural	
discourse	where	 religion	was	 generally	 perceived	 as	 culturally	 interesting	 but	
waning	 in	 terms	 of	 political	 significance.	 Yet	 the	 emergence	 of	 Islam	 as	 a	
publicly‐articulated	mark	of	 identity	was	perceived	as	a	threat	by	a	secularised	
media	 establishment	 alongside	 the	 increasingly	 Islamophobic	 right.	 	 	 What	 is	
noteworthy	 in	 terms	 of	 our	 concerns	 here	 is	 the	 significance	 that	 Modood	
attributes	 to	 the	 space	 created	 by	 cross‐religious	 dialogue	 during	 the	 Rushdie	
affair.	
	
…	what	was	 even	more	 striking	was	 that	 when	 the	 public	 rage	 against	
Muslims	was	at	its	most	intense,	Muslims	neither	sought	nor	were	offered	
any	special	solidarity	by	any	nonwhite	minority.	It	was	in	fact,	a	group	of	
white	 liberal	 Anglicans	 who	 tried	 to	 moderate	 hostility	 against	 angry	
Muslims,	 and	 it	 was	 in	 interfaith	 forum	 a	 rather	 than	 in	 political‐black		
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organizations	 that	 space	 was	 created	 for	 Muslims	 to	 state	 their	 case	
without	being	vilified.		(Modood,	2002:	pp)	
	
It	is	not	only	the	liberal	elite	or	conservative	media	that	struggled	with	the	new,	
post‐secular	 public	 space,	 however.	 Whilst	 much	 of	 the	 focus	 in	 community	
relations	was	 concerned	with	 ‘multiculturalism’	 and	 the	presence	of	Black	 and	
south	Asian	communities	as	an	enrichment	of	British	culture,	such	an	emphasis	
did	 little	 to	understand	 the	 impact	of	mass	 immigration	upon	white	British	 (or	
English)	 identity.	 Indigenous	white	 culture	 is	 often	 portrayed	 as	 eclipsed	 by	 a	
regime	of	 ‘steel‐drums,	samosas	and	saris’	with	 few	outlets	other	than	football,	
‘chav’	culture	and	the	reoccupation	of	city	centres	through	the	night‐time	leisure	
economy.		
	
Some	attempts	have	been	made,	however,	to	address	this	lack	of	attention.	The	
Runnymede	 Trust,	 ‘an	 independent	 policy	 research	 organisation	 focusing	 on	
equality	and	justice	through	the	promotion	of	a	successful	multi‐ethnic	society’,	
recently	 published	 a	 document	 Who	 cares	 about	 the	 white	 working	 class?	
(Sveinssson,	 2009).	 Exploring	 how	 issues	 of	 ethnicity	 and	 class	 play	 out	 in	 a	
constantly	measured	 and	monitored	multicultural	 society,	 educationalist	David	
Gillborn	warns	of	the	danger	of		creating	‘white	racial	victimhood’		and	the	myth	
of	advantage	given	to	minoritorised	children	in	the	education	system,	as	well	as	
the	potentially	negative	effects	policy	changes	could	have.		
	
By	 warning	 of	 the	 danger	 of	 inflaming	 support	 for	 racist	 parties,	 what	
actually	happens	is	that	politicians	and	commentators	invoke	the	threat	of	
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racist	 violence	 as	 a	means	of	 disciplining	 calls	 for	 greater	 race	 equality.	
[….]Official	statistics	reveal	that	most	groups	in	poverty	achieve	relatively	
poor	results	regardless	of	ethnic	background.	(Gilborn,	2009)	
	
Similarly,	a	recent	report	commissioned	by	the	Department	for	Communities	and	
Local	Government	argued	 that	 the	 successful	 integration	of	migrants	 into	 local	
communities	 is	 significantly	 conditioned	 by	 local,	 predominantly	 economic,	
factors:	
...	 we	 found	 that	 in	 those	 [places]	 where	 social	 and	 environmental	
conditions	were	better,	 there	was	 ...	 less	apparent	hostility	 to	minorities	
[...]	By	 far	 the	most	 frequent	context	 for	referring	to	ethnic	minorities	 is	
that	of	perceived	competition	 for	 resources	–	 typically	housing,	but	also	
employment,	 benefits,	 territory	 and	 culture.	 (Garner,	 Cowles	 and	 Lung,	
2009:	6)		
	
Such	 resentment,	 whilst	 reprehensible,	 has	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 one	 response	 to	
economic	 pressures.	 	 Black	 and	 ethnic	 minorities	 and	 the	 forces	 of	 ‘political	
correctness’	 are	 held	 up	 as	 scapegoats	 in	 a	 context	 of	 perceived	 unfairness	 of	
access	to	material	benefits;	and	in	a	political	climate	in	which	the	biggest	threat	
to	 our	way	 of	 life	 is	 often	 equated	with	 so‐called	 ‘radical	 Islam’,	 it	 is	 timely	 to	
consider	 how	 such	 attitudes	 feed	 into	 the	 activities	 of	 far‐Right	 political	
movements	which	represent,	arguably,	a	far	more	tangible	threat	to	democracy	
and	social	cohesion.		
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The	‘post‐secular’	public	space	
	
As	 Modood	 comments,	 multiculturalism	 itself	 is	 in	 many	 respects	 a	 child	 of	
liberalism.	 It	 is	 founded,	 conceptually,	 on	 differences	 of	 ethnicity	 and	 ‘race’,	
reflecting	the	preoccupations	of	a	relatively	secular	generation	of	social	science	
which	took	little	substantial	account	of	religion	as	a	marker	of	identity.	This	has	
led,	 increasingly,	 to	 criticisms	 of	 the	 public	 sector	 and	 local	 and	 national	
government,	for	example,	for	their	lack	of	‘religious	literacy’	in	taking	account	of	
the	 needs	 of	 different	 sections	 of	 the	 community.	 Many	 commentators	 (see	
especially	 Dinham,	 Furbey	 and	 Lowndes,	 2009),	 argue	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	
‘faith’	into	the	multicultural	pot	has	led	to	significant	reappraisal	not	only	of	the	
liberal	roots	of	multiculturalism	but	a	recognition	that	questions	of	identity	and	
allegiance	across	different	communities	in	Britain	are	complex	and	fluid.	As	local	
and	 national	 government	 and	 other	 policy‐makers	 are	 rapidly	 discovering,	
religious	affiliation	and	identity	cannot	be	bracketed	out	of	these	contentions.		
	
But	the	debate	continues	as	to	the	appropriate	kind	of	engagement	by	people	of	
faith	in	the	public	domain.	On	the	one	hand,	we	have	the	greater	public	profile	of	
faith‐based	groups	as	active	participants	in	civil	society;	on	the	other,	those	who	
continue	 to	 believe	 that	 adherence	 to	 the	 demands	 of	 any	 kind	 of	 	 theology	
represents	 a	 denial	 of	 liberal	 values	 with	 an	 inevitable	 retreat	 into	 more	
pernicious	 forms	 of	 segregation	 and	 extremism.	 	 	 	 A	 recent	 contributor	 to	 the	
debate	has	been	Alan	Billings	–	priest,	broadcaster	and	New	Labour	apologist.	In	
God	 and	 Community	 Cohesion:	 Help	 or	 Hindrance	 (2009)	 Billings	 presents	 a	
pessimistic	 approach	 to	 attempts	 to	 establish	 common	 ground	 among	 faith	
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communities	 and	 shared	 vision	 within	 diverse	 cities.	 He	 notes	 the	
precariousness	 of	 attempts	 to	 build	 cohesive	 communities	 at	 a	 time	when	 the	
legitimacy	 of	 pluralism	 is	 barely	 acknowledged	 internally	 within	 religious	
traditions.	
	
As	a	result,	there	has	been	growing	attention	to	the	question	of	the	public	role	of	
religion	in	a	multicultural	society.	Most	prominently,	and	most	controversially,	of	
course,	 is	 the	debate	about	social	cohesion	and	the	perceived	 ‘threat’	of	radical	
Islam,	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 policies	 such	 as	 PREVENT	 and	 ‘Face‐to‐Face	
and	Side‐by‐Side’	(DCLG,	2007).	There	is	criticism	that	the	PREVENT	agenda	fails	
to	 address	 issues	 of	 non‐Islamic	 extremisms	 and	 violence,	 not	 least	 that	
provoked	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 British	 National	 Party	 and	 English	 Defence	
League	 (see	 Kundnani,	 2009).	 	 There	 is	 also	 wide	 misgiving	 amongst	 faith	
communities	themselves,	especially	within	Islam,	of	the	way	in	which	faith‐based	
organisations	 are	 being	 instrumentalised,	 almost	 as	 vehicles	 of	 social	 control,	
and	that	the	predominant	paradigm	of	faith	and	its	public	impact	on	the	part	of	
government	is	that	of	‘delivering’	particular	social	outcomes.	The	bizarre	reverse	
side	 is	 that	Christian	 leaders	 find	themselves	having	to	explain	to	Muslims	that	
they	have	no	contact	with	or	control	over	the	BNP	despite	its	claims	of	Christian	
identity.	
	
More	 benignly,	 perhaps,	 is	 also	 the	 potential	 of	 faith	 groups	 to	 participate	 in	
programmes	of	social,	cultural	and	economic	renewal,	and	even,	on	the	margins	
of	mainstream	political	life,	to	take	up	certain	aspects	of	welfare	provision.	So	we	
have	 begun	 to	 see	 how	 so‐called	 ‘faith	 communities’	 are	 being	 brought	 into	
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processes	 of	 governance	 and	 participation:	 as	 sources	 of	 capacity‐building	 in	
local	communities	and	constructive	agents	in	programmes	of	social	cohesion,	as	
well	as	in	the	prevention	of	religious	and	political	extremism.		
	
	
The	Problem	of	Whiteness	in	a	multicoloured	society		
	
But	 does	 this	 re‐emergence	 of	 faith	 as	 part	 of	 a	 ‘thick	 description’	 of	 modern	
citizenship	 actually	 disenfranchise	 some	 people?	 Ted	 Cantle,	 author	 of	 the	
Report	into	the	Oldham	riots	of	2001,	has	remarked	that	‘the	majority	population	
have	 always	 felt	 unrepresented	 by	 the	 notion	 [of	multiculturalism]’	 (Cantle	 in	
Lowndes,	2009:	93).	He	continues,	 ‘if	you	ask	white	people,	for	example,	if	they	
have	an	ethnicity,	they	don’t	seem	to	appreciate	that	they	have	 ...	They	also	see	
‘diversity’	 as	 something	 that	 is	 only	 relevant	 to	 minorities.	 Similarly,	 most	
[white]	people	see	faith	as	another	dimension	which	doesn’t	include	them	–	the	
British	 tradition	has	been	built	upon	 the	submerging	of	 faith	differences	 in	 the	
public	 sphere.’	 (Cantle	 in	 Lowndes,	 2009:	 93)	 So	 there	 are	 ways	 in	 which	
‘multiculturalism’,	 if	 not	 failing	 the	 indigenous	 white	 British	 population,	 has	
proved	wanting	in	terms	of	white	‘buy‐in’	which	furnishes	them	with	the	means	
to	construct	an	identity	or	self‐understanding	to	match,	and	negotiate	with,		that	
of	 others.	 	 Stuart	 Hall	 is	 convinced,	 however,	 that	 while	 negotiation	 is	 critical	
over	conflicts	of	‘outlook,	belief	and	interest’	they	must	not	assume	‘Eurocentric	
assimilation’	as	the	starting	or	end	point:				
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The	specific	and	particular	 “difference”	of	a	group	or	community	cannot	
be	asserted	absolutely	,	without	regard	to	the	wider	context	provided	by	
all	 those	 “others”	 in	 relation	 to	whom	 “particularity”	 acquires	 a	 relative	
value.	(Hall,	2000:	234)		
	
Assumptions	 are	 made	 about	 cultural	 homogeneity	 by	 those	 contesting	 a	
community,	as	well	as	by	the	media	and	commentators.	It	is	apparent	that	white,	
African‐Caribbean	and	Asian	communities	all	contain	elements	of	difference	and	
hybrity	that	require	internal	negotiation,	as	well	as	challenges	being	made	to	an	
older	 leadership	concerned	with	 influence	and	stability,	often	 through	violence	
or	indifference	(Amin,	2002).	
	
To	what	extent	are	Right‐wing	extremist	groups	exploiting	that	vacuum	in	white	
communities?	 The	 re‐emergence	 of	 faith	 in	 terms	 of	 identity,	 rather	 than	
practice,	gives	rise	to	many	tiny	 ‘clashes	of	civilisations’	which	offer	 little	space	
for	 greater	 and	 smaller	 narratives	 of	 interaction	 and	 negotiation	 between	 and	
within	 communities.	 	 There	 is	 certainly	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 Right‐wing	
extremist	groups	and	movements	are	shifting	their	rhetoric	increasingly	towards	
Islamophobic	statements	and	actions,	as	 in	 for	example,	the	mobilisation	of	the	
English	Defence	League	to	demonstrate	against	what	it	terms	‘Islamic	extremism’	
in	 places	 such	 as	 Luton,	 Rochdale,	 Birmingham	 and	 Manchester	 (Searchlight,	
August	 2009:	 8‐9).	 Nick	 Griffin,	 leader	 of	 the	 BNP,	 has	 described	 Islam	 as	 a	
‘cancer’	 that	 needed	 ‘chemotherapy	 ...	 to	 save	 civilization’	 (Searchlight,	 August	
2009:	10).	
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What	is	intriguing	is	the	attempt	by	many	of	these	groups	to	hijack	a	‘Christian’	
identity	 around	 which	 they	 hope	 to	 rally	 indigenous	 White	 support	 that	
perceives	 itself	 as	 having	 been	 disenfranchised	 by	 the	 ideology	 of	
multiculturalism.	So	for	example,	the	English	Defence	League	reproduces	images	
of	Crusaders	in	its	publicity,	with	a	poem	that	includes	the	lines:		
	
The	crusaders	were	once	strong,	now	all	but	gone	
...	But	im	[sic]	here	sword	out	of	sheath	...		
...	My	thirst	[f]or	blood	grows	stronger	
The	pain	cant	take	no	longer	
For	foreign	blood	I	hunger’	(Bartholomew,	2009).	
	
In	the	campaign	for	the	European	elections	in	June	2009	the	BNP	produced		an	
image	of	Jesus	on	a	poster		which	was	driven	round	northern	cities	on	the	back	of	
the	party’s	‘truth	truck’.		The	post	carried	a	quotation	from	John	15:20,	reading,	
‘If	they	have	persecuted	me,	they	will	also	persecute	you’,	and	the	commentary,	
“What	 would	 Jesus	Do?	 –	 Vote	 BNP”.	 The	 two	 Archbishops	 of	 Canterbury	 and	
York	felt	moved	to	issue	a	joint	statement,	together	with	a	letter	to	be	read	in	all	
parishes,	repudiating	these	connections,	saying:	
	
Christians	have	been	deeply	disturbed	by	 the	conscious	adoption	by	 the	
BNP	of	the	language	of	our	faith	when	the	effect	of	those	policies	is	not	to	
promote	those	values	but	to	foster	fear	and	division	within	communities,	
especially	between	people	of	different	faiths	or	racial	background.	(Joint	
Statement,	24	May	2009).	
 14
	
The	 BNP	 response	 was	 to	 issue	 a	 leaflet,	 distributed	 outside	 a	 number	 of	
churches	and	cathedrals,	entitled	Judas	Archbishops:	
	
All	 over	 the	 UK	 pews	 are	 emptying;	 churches	 are	 closing	 down	 and	
turning	 into	 mosques/	 temples.	 Our	 distinctive	 Christian	 heritage	 is	
disappearing	 as	 whole	 regions	 of	 Britain	 become	 Islamified.	 […]The	
cowardly	‘yes	men’,	functionaries	and	time‐servers	leading	the	Church	of	
England	 have	 consistently	 failed	 to	 lift	 a	 finger	 in	 defence	 of	 Britain	
against	those	who	would	destroy	it.	Cocooned	in	their	ivory	towers	from	
any	 meaningful	 contact	 with	 the	 outside	 world,	 real	 life	 or	 ordinary	
people,	they	pass	one	surrender	motion	after	another.	(Judas	Archbishops	
–	BNP	leaflet	May	2009)	
	
Much	of	this	association	may	appear	irrelevant,	particularly	for	anyone	with	any	
direct	 experience	 of	 the	 demographic	 profile	 of	 the	 twenty‐first	 century	urban	
Church.	 It	 is	 remarkable	 to	 consider	 how	 far	 all	 the	 Christian	 denominations,	
including	 the	 Church	 of	 England,	 depend	 increasingly	 for	 their	 continued	
viability	on	members	whose	personal	or	family	backgrounds	originate	in	Africa,	
the	 Caribbean	 and,	 increasingly,	 Eastern	 Europe	 or	 Latin	America.	 The	 local	 is	
also	the	global;	but	it	is	emphatically	not	the	racially	pure	English	Church	of	BNP	
or	EDL	fantasy!		
	
But	 this	 use	 of	 religion	 –	 or	 at	 least	 a	 discourse	 of	 a	 particular	 construal	 of	
religion	–	does	seem	to	be	a	critical	aspect	of	 the	rise	of	 the	 far	Right	over	 the	
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past	couple	of	years.	And	this	threat	is	not	theoretical,	since	two	BNP	candidates,	
Nick	Griffin	and	Andrew	Brons,	were	elected	to	the	European	Parliament	for	the	
North‐West	 and	 Yorkshire	 &	 Humberside	 regions	 respectively.	 The	 BNP’s		
electoral	 strongholds	 seem	 to	 be	 in	 predominantly	 white	 working‐class	
communities	 with	 higher	 than	 average	 levels	 of	 unemployment	 and	 economic	
decline:	post	 industrial	areas	or	 large	social	housing	developments.	Admittedly,	
there	 were	 particular	 factors	 behind	 the	 success	 of	 the	 BNP	 in	 the	 local	 and	
European	elections	of	May	2009,	such	as	a	slump	in	the	traditional	Labour	vote,	
and	 widespread	 revulsion	 at	 the	 MPs’	 expenses	 scandal.	 Yet	 this	 may	 still	 be	
regarded	 as	 consistent	 with	 the	 opportunism	 of	 the	 far	 Right	 in	 exploiting	
people’s	 disaffection	 with	 mainstream	 politics,	 including	 policies	 of	
multiculturalism	 and	 regeneration	 that	 are	 perceived	 as	 unfairly	 favouring	
ethnic	minorities	 and	metropolitan	 elites.	 	 It	 adds	 up	 to	 a	 serious	 problem	 of	
voter	disengagement,	a	‘democratic	deficit’,	that	moves	swiftly	into	the	electoral	
vacuum	of	White	British/English	identity	with	dangerous	consequences.	
	
Alongside	 the	 democratic	 deficit	 comes	 the	 cultural	 deficit	 fed	 by	 a	 general	
religious	 illiteracy.	 Questions	 of	 identity	 are	 raised	 for	 the	 majority	 when	 the	
religious	 difference	 of	 ‘the	 other’	 is	 perceived	 in	 public	 space:	 through	 civic	
celebrations	of	Eid	or	Diwali,	the	wearing	of	headscarves	or	turbans,	the	requests	
for	 prayer	 rooms	 or	 specially	 prepared	 food.	 The	 BNP’s	 advocacy	 of	 Christian	
identity	 comes	 at	 a	 time	 when	 the	 reassertion	 of	 identity	 is	 encouraged	 by	
Bishops	 and	 other	 leaders,	 whether	 it	 is	 the	 public	 wearing	 of	 crosses	 and	
crucifixes,	the	civic	acknowledgement	of	Christmas	as	a	Christian	festival,	or	the	
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establishment	of	St	George’s	Day	as	an	English	public	holiday	–	all	of	which	have	
found	their	place	in	the	BNP’s	campaigns	as	tribal	totems.	
	
	
The	right	to	the	city	
What	are	 the	 tools	and	resources	which	might	enable	 the	Church	 to	rebuild	 its	
understanding	of	civic	engagement	in	a	culturally	and	religiously	diverse	society	
in	 the	 face	 of	 economic	 interests,	 disaffection	 with	 the	 political	 system	 and	
organised	racism?							The	ability	to	mobilise	across	communities	is	critical		to	an		
urban	 rights	 discourse	 which	 has	 significant	 connections	 with	 a	 	 liberationist	
perspective,	as	well	as	the	concerns	of	the	emergent	public	theology	movement	
(See	Davey,	2008)	;	but	we	have	yet	to	develop	an	understanding	and	vocabulary	
that	 enables	 us	 to	 	 develop	 a	 theologically	 rooted	 progressive	 urbanism	 that	
overcomes	 alienation	 and	 celebrates	 the	 contribution	 of	 ordinary	 citizens	
through	engaging	outside	the	Church’s	traditional	comfort	zones.		
	
Influenced	by	 the	work	of	Henri	Lefebvre	 leading	urbanists	have	 identified	 the	
concept	 of	 ‘the	 right	 to	 the	 city’	 (le	droit	à	 la	 ville)as	 a	 critical	 resource	 in	 the	
neoliberal,	 postsecular	 city.	 Access	 and	 participation	 in	 urban	 life	 and	 spaces	
needs	to	be	reasserted	as	cities	restructure	spatially,	economically	and	socially.	
David	 Harvey	 argues	 that,	 ‘The	 freedom	 to	 make	 and	 remake	 our	 cities	 and	
ourselves	 is…one	 of	 the	 most	 precious	 yet	 neglected	 of	 our	 human	 rights’	
(Harvey	2008).	 	Ash	Amin	has	written	of	the	need	to	fashion	a	 ‘politics	of	well‐
being	 and	 emancipation	 out	 of	 multiplicity	 and	 difference	 and	 from	 the	
particularities	of	the	urban	experience’	(Amin	2006).		It	is	a	critical	question	for	
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urbanists	 how	 a	 wider	 spectrum	 of	 interests	 can	 play	 a	 crucial	 part	 in	
reimagining	the	city	and	staking	a	claim	to	common	urban	future.	It	is	vital	that	
the	discourse	and	activities	of	urbanists	are	not	another	reason	for	the	alienation	
of	 the	 urban	 dispossessed.	 	 Patsy	 Healey’s	 often	 quoted	 phrase	 about	 the	
common	 quest	 about	 ‘how	 to	 manage	 our	 co‐existence	 in	 shared	 space’	 is	 a	
starting	point	(Healey,	1997:3).	That	shared	space	might	be	the	neighbourhood,	
the	municipality	or	the	society.	Finding	commonality	will	move	us	to	the	edge	of	
the	concerns	of			funding	and	policy.		
	
In	recent	years	Church	 interventions	have	revealed	a	range	of	 intersecting	and	
opposing	 views	 of	 urban	 life,	 diversity,	 the	 power	 of	 urban	 structures,	 the	
meaning	 and	 pitfalls	 of	 living	 in	 close	 proximity	 to	 mainstream	 	 policy	 and	
solutions.	Just	as	Alan	Cochrane	describes	government	interventions	as	a	‘policy	
area	 presenting	 different	 forms	 of	 utopia’	 (Cochrane,	 2007:.145)	 we	 need	 to	
consider	the	Church’s	theology	and	work	on	the	urban	to	be	the	construction	of	a	
vision	or	imaginary	that	needs	earthing.	Those	utopias	are	imagined	as	part	of	a	
strategy	for	developing	an	understanding	of	the	underlying	values	of	the	desired	
city	 (kingdom)	and	 the	activities	 (praxis	or	performance)	needed	 for	brining	 it	
about.	Decisions	about	how	church	property	is	used,	how	mission	is	carried	out,	
how	the	church	engages	in	the	wider	civic	realm	and	identifies	allies	will	all	have	
implications	for	how	the	identity	of	the	church	forms	among	its	members	as	well	
as	within	 the	 local	 community.	Who	 is	 the	 church	 there	 for?	What	will	 be	 the	
impact	 of	 those	 decisions	 on	 different	 faith	 or	 ethnic	 communities?	 Those	
performances	 are	 often	matters	 of	 contestation	 as	 different	 imaginaries	 comes	
into	conflict:	unambiguous	evangelism	among	migrants	or	the	pursuit	of	mutual	
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action;	the	sale	of	a	piece	of	land	to	fund	new	projects	or	 	social	and	affordable	
housing;	 	 a	 profitable	 lease	 to	 a	 private	 nursery	 or	 a	 volunteer	 playgroup;	 an	
academy	school	or	a	community	college.	Some	of	those	choices		may	be	counter	
cultural	acts,	or	the	creation	of	new	‘habits’	that			resist			the	often	overwhelming	
cultural,	theological	and	political	pressure	for	caution	and	security	we	find	in	the	
church	and	our	urban	communities.		
	
Ash	Amin	writes	of		
	
…	the	good	city	as	an	expanding	habit	of	solidarity	and	as	a	practical	but	
unsettled	 achievement,	 constantly	 building	 on	 experiments	 through	
which	difference	and	multiplicity	can	be	mobilised	for	common	gain	and	
against	harm	and	want.	[Where	a]	civic	politics	of	getting	the	urban	habit	
of	living	with	diversity	right	is	one	way	of	thickening	the	ways	in	which	an	
increasingly	fragmented,	disoriented	and	anxious	society	can	regain	some	
mechanism	for	the	distribution	of	hopefulness…	(Amin,	2006)			
	
In	 what	 ways	 might	 the	 Church’s	 action	 and	 theological	 interventions	 be	
expanding	 the	 habits	 of	 solidarity?	 	 Three	 case	 studies	 follow,	which	 illustrate	
possible	ways	 in	which	 the	Church	within	 its	 community	 context	has	begun	 to	
articulate	 constructive	 forms	 of	 engagement	 with	 the	 political	 situation.	 We	
cannot	pretend	that	by	themselves	they	constitute	decisive	arguments	in	favour	
of	 maintaining	 the	 status	 quo,	 but	 maybe	 they	 start	 to	 indicate	 some	 of	 the	
principles	for	both	Church	and	society	on	which	any	civic	role	of	religion			might	
rest.		
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The	 first	 example	 shows	 how	 churches	 worked	 to	 build	 a	 positive	 political	
coalition	 in	 the	 fight	against	extremism.	 In	advance	of	 the	 June	elections	 to	 the	
European	 Parliament,	 it	 was	 known	 that	 the	 BNP	 were	 statistically	 close	 to	
winning	 some	 seats,	 so	 a	 broad‐based	 alliance	 called	 HOPE	 not	 Hate	 was	
founded,	 sponsored	 by	 trade	 unions,	 anti‐fascist	 groups	 and	 the	 investigative	
journal	 Searchlight.	 Faith	 groups,	 including	 and	 especially	 Church	 of	 England	
leaders	 and	 staff,	 were	 also	 prominent.	 In	 the	 NW,	 for	 example,	 the	HOPE	not	
Hate	 campaign	 was	 launched	 at	 Manchester	 Anglican	 Cathedral,	 and	 the	
resources	 of	 the	 staff	 of	 the	 diocesan	 Board	 for	 Ministry	 and	 Society	 kept	 up	
much	of	the	momentum.	Unfortunately,	of	course,	the	voting	maths	only	limited	
the	scale	of	the	BNP	‘break	through’,	but	the	campaign	has	continued	to	mobilise,		
for	example	 to	ensure	 that	 there	was	a	prominent	Christian	voice	 in	 the	cross‐
community	opposition	to	the	EDL	rally	held	in	Manchester	in	October	2009.	
	
One	framework	for	understanding	the	contribution	of	faith‐based	organisations	
to	the	public	realm	has	been	social	capital	theory.	For	Robert	Putnam,	a	healthy	
civil	society	rests	on	people’s	capacity	to	be	active	citizens	and	to	contribute	to	
their	 communities,	 which	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 skills,	 values	 and	 resources	 at	
their	disposal	that	enable	them	to	mobilise	and	to	form	relationships	both	within	
and	 between	 immediate	 communities	 of	 interest	 (Putnam,	 2000).	 It	 has	 been	
further	 noted	 that	 religious	 people	 and	 organisations	 are	 particularly	 rich	 in	
sources	 of	 social	 capital,	 because	 they	 have	 strong	 values,	 a	 clear	 collective	
identity,	possess	buildings	and	physical	resources	 that	offer	good	 facilities,	and	
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are	well‐connected	to	local,	national	and	global	expressions	of	their	faith	(CULF,	
2006;	Baker	and	Skinner,	2006).		
	
Nick	Lowles,	editor	of	Searchlight,	writing	in	advance	of	the	Euro	elections,	uses	
just	such	a	model	of	faith	groups	as	invaluable	repositories	of	‘faithful	capital’	in	
reflecting	on	the	HOPE	not	Hate	campaign:	
	
Faith	groups	will	be	crucial.	They	have	a	credibility	and	authority	in	many	
of	 the	 communities	 where	 local	 politicians	 have	 disengaged.	 In	 Greater	
Manchester	alone,	the	Anglican	Church	has	over	500	full‐time	employees	
and	a	similar	number	of	part‐time	workers,	and	the	church	as	a	whole	has	
the	largest	community	outreach	project	in	the	country.	Give	these	people	
the	arguments	and	 tools	 to	 take	 the	message	 to	 their	congregations	and	
we	are	really	beginning	to	motor.	(Lowles,	April	2009:	5)	
	
The	second	example	may	be	familiar	from	the	BBC	TV	series,	The	Choir:	Unsung	
Town	 (2009),	This	 featured	 the	 community	of	 South	Oxhey,	 in	Hertfordshire,	 a	
large	 post‐war	 social	 housing	 estate,	 with	 many	 of	 the	 characteristics	 of	 high	
unemployment,	low	educational	achievement	and	social	problems;	a	community	
often	considered	out	of	place,	or	out	of	 step,	with	 the	surrounding	affluence	of	
the	 Home	 Counties.	 The	musician	 and	 conductor	 Gareth	Malone	 established	 a	
community	 choir	 which	 has	 had	 notable	 success	 and	 continues	 to	 this	 day,	
despite	initial	problems	of	apathy	and	lack	of	confidence.		
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The	invitation	to	the	BBC	to	make	the	programme	came	originally	from	the	local	
Anglican	priest,	Pam	Wise.	Whilst	much	of	the	narrative	of	the	subsequent	series	
focused	 on	 the	 stories	 of	 individuals,	 the	 Church	 was	 a	 constant	 source	 of	
support,	 providing	 an	 office	 base	 for	Malone	 and	 a	 significant	 volunteer	 base.	
Once	again,	 it	 is	Lowles’	evocation	of	the	grass‐roots	activism	both	of	HOPE	not	
Hate	and	of	the	churches	in	general,	that	is	probably	the	most	critical	role	for	the	
Church	 in	 such	 areas	where	 there	 are	 significant	 extremist	 threats.	 It	 is	 in	 the	
Church’s	localism	and	its	capacity	to	mobilise	a	wealth	of	local	social	capital	that	
can	 potentially	 pay	 dividends	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 new	 and	 robust	 articulations	 of	
civic	pride.			
	
South	Oxhey	Community	Choir	is	in	many	respects	a	classic	case	study	in	social	
capital,	 in	 that	 it	 illustrates	 how	 the	 revival	 of	 the	 instruments	 of	 local	 civil	
society	helped	to	rejuvenate	local	community	pride.		Furthermore,	a	‘coda’	to	this	
story	 offers	 further	 suggestions	 that	 the	 choir	 has	 succeeded	 in	 fostering	 an	
alternative	 account	 of	 civic	 identity	 that	 is	 less	 prone	 to	 the	 resentments	
highlighted	by	the	Runnymede	Trust	and	DCLG.	 	The	British	National	Party	had	
earlier	 experienced	 some	 electoral	 gains	 in	 south	 Hertfordshire,	 including	 the	
election	 of	 a	 candidate	 to	 the	 county	 council.	 When	 the	 councillor	 concerned	
offered	 a	 portion	 of	 her	 discretionary	 budget	 to	 the	 choir	 to	 appear	 at	 a	
sponsored	event,	however,	the	choir	refused,	a	decision	that	drew	considerable	
media	coverage.	(Lancaster	Voice,	2009)	
	
In	 Lancashire,	 the	 church’s	 response	 to	 the	 2001	 riots	 and	 the	 subsequent	
report’s	 assertion	 of	 spatial	 and	 cultural	 segregation	 has	 been	 focused	 on	 the	
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Building	Bridges	in	Burnley		programme	which	seeks	to		‘achieve	a	shared	sense	
of	belonging	amongst	the	people	of	Burnley’		through		a	‘broad	range	of	activities	
delivered	 create	 opportunities	 for	 people	 from	 different	 faith,	 cultural,	 socio‐
economic	 contexts’	 (see	 http://bbburnley.co.uk/FaithFriends.aspx).	 The	
programme	has	had	major	influence	in	communities	where	there	had	been	little	
encounter	or	mutual	understanding,	particularly	among	young	people.	Activities	
have	 included	 intercommunity	encounters,	 the	development	of	 ‘faith	 friends’‐	a	
shared	chaplaincy	programme	in	local	schools,	pilgrimages	and	participation	in	
mainstream			events	such	as	interfaith	week.		 	A	significant	decision	to	base	the	
programme	in	a	mosque,	rather	than	a	church,	provided	a	clear	statement	on	the	
sharing	of	resources	and	access.	On	a	recent	visit	the	Archbishop	of	Canterbury	
commented:		
		
I	 think	 the	 depth	 of	 friendship	 there	 is	 between	 representatives	 of	
different	 faiths	here	 is	pretty	 impressive	 in	 itself,	 but	 also	 listening	 to	 a	
twelve	 year	 old	 talking	 about	 her	 part	 in	 building	 bridges	 between	
communities	 and	 the	 work	 that’s	 done	 to	 keep	 children	 of	 different	
communities	in	touch	with	each	other	and	sharing	experiences,	that	is	so	
precious	 and	 so	 unusual	 I	 think,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 country	 as	 a	whole,	 is	
something	 that	 ought	 to	 be	 bottled	 and	 exported	 from	 Burnley.	 (Radio	
Lancashire	5th	November	2009)	
	
Building	 Bridges	 in	 Burnley	 has	 stood	 alongside	 similar	 programmes	 and	
interventions	attempting	to	foster	new	links	and	confidence	in	the	future	across	
the	town.			An	indication	of	the	change	experienced	in	Burnley	since	2001	might	
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be	seen	 in	 the	 radical	 reduction	 in	 the	BNP	presence	on	 the	 local	 council	 from	
twelve	councillors	to	three.			
	
Conclusion	
In	 the	examples	above	and	many	others	we	see	 the	possibility	of	new	forms	of	
civil	 society	 emerging	 from	 the	 new,	 post‐secular	 contentions	 of	 religious	
identity	 and	 race.	 The	 reproduction	 of	 social	 capital	 is	 not	 always	 a	 natural	
outcome	 of	 the	 presence	 of	 faith	 in	 the	 public	 realm,	 which	 often	 enters	 that	
space	out	of	the	frustration	and	anger	of	groups	which	have	been	marginal	to	the	
economy	 of	 urban	 regeneration	 in	 the	 past	 decades.	 Violent	 competing	 claims	
are	often	local	reactions	to,	or	refractions	of,	wider	structural	forces	played	out	
on	a	global	stage.	The		‘othering’	of	groups	within	our	cities	and	towns,	be	it	the	
racialized	 othering	 found	 in	 popular	 press	 portrayal	 of	 Muslims	 and	 other	
Asians,	 or	 the	 pseudo‐sociological	 rhetoric	 of	 chavs	 and	 underclasses	 find	
immediate	 scapegoats	 but	 fail	 to	 take	 into	 account	 issues	 of	 power,	 access	 to	
education	 and	 employment	 or	 the	 superficial	 appeal	 of	 pejorative	 media	
representation.				
	
Urbanists	 often	 invoke	 the	 contested	 nature	 of	 urban	 space	 as	 a	 source	 of	 the	
city’s	 dialectical	 creativity	 (see	 Merrifield,	 2002).	 These	 points	 of	 friction	 will	
need	 to	 be	 acknowledged	 and	 negotiated	 innovatively,	 rather	 than	 ignored	 or	
accommodated,	 if	 the	 urban	 is	 to	 be	 diverted	 from	 the	 dysfunctional	 and	
dystopian	realities	we	have	been	describing.	The	Church’s	engagement	with	the	
public	realm	of	post‐secular	cities	in	the	twenty‐first	century	will	need	to	shed	its	
political	naivety	and	class	predisposition	if	it	is	to	be	alongside	the	struggles	for	
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social	 justice	 in	 cities	 that	 are	 increasingly	 diverse	 and	 in	 danger	 of	 being	
increasingly	segregated.	
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